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SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY 
PRIORITIES: A REVIEW OF
CURRENT THEORIES
ALAN SCHWARTZ* 
�N recent years , finance economists have begun to study several prac­
tices that the law traditionally regulates .  Examples include attempted 
explanations of the variety of debt and equity instruments that firms is­
sue , 1 the nature of bond covenants, 2 the functions that trade credit serves3 
and the likely actions of creditors when their debtor becomes insolvent. 4 
These studies are illuminating and provocative , but represent only the 
beginning of coherent explanations of the phenomena. Also , the norma­
tive implications of this relatively incomplete understanding have been 
unexplored.  Lawyers assume these financial practices to be well under­
stood and, consequently, have erected regulatory structures that presup­
pose the truth of what now seem preliminary or questionable positivist 
theories .  This paper explores a particular financial practice-the issuance 
of debt secured by personal property-and a regulatory scheme relevant 
to this practice-the setting of distributional priorities when an insolvent 
firm is liquidated.  My principal purpose is to illuminate the unresolved 
* Visiting Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of Technology; 
Maurice Jones, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I would 
like to thank John Borgo, David Carroll, Robert Forsythe, Michael J. Graetz, Thomas H. 
Jackson, Anthony T. Kronman, George L. Priest, Robert E. Scott, Matthew Spitzer, James 
Strnad and Louis L. Wilde for very helpful suggestions. This paper also benefited substan­
tially from comments received at the Law and Economics Workshop at the University of 
Chicago and the University of Southern California Faculty Workshop. Portions of this paper 
will appear in revised form in Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Commercial Law: Princi­
ples and Policies (forthcoming). 
1 Charles W. Haley & Lawrence D. Schall, The Theory of Financial Decisions 379-83 (2d 
ed. 1 979). 
2 Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants ( 1 979) (Working Paper #MERC 78-04, Univ. of Rochester). 
3 Robert A. Schwartz & David K. Whitcomb, The Trade Credit Decision, in Handbook of 
Financial Economics 257 (James L. Bicksler, ed. 1 979). 
4 Jeremy I. Bulow & John B.  Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 Bell J. Econ. 437 
( 1978). For critical comments, see James S. Ang & Jess H. Chua, Coalitions, the Me-First 
Rule, and the Liquidation Decision, 1 1  Bell J. Econ. 355 ( 1 980). 
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problems in this field and to illustrate the relevance of the achievements 
and unaccomplished tasks of modern finance to areas of business law that 
have developed largely independently of this discipline . 
If an insolvent debtor' s business is liquidated, its secured creditors may 
take property subject to their liens before any other creditors are paid. 5 
Congress has also created six classes of "priority" creditors , the most 
important of which are expenses of administration (first priority) , wage 
and employee-benefit claims up to limited amounts (third and fourth 
priority) and taxes (sixth priority) . Each priority class is paid in full, to the 
extent available assets exist , before the next class is paid . 6 Finally, 
"general" creditors , those without security interests or priority status , 
receive payment if payment is possible .  As this priority list suggests, 
secured creditors do much better than general creditors in bankruptcy 
liquidations . 
The principal justification for a distribution scheme that seemingly ad­
vantages the sophisticated and relatively affluent, who often take secu­
rity, at the expense of the relatively poor and unsophisticated, who often 
do not, is that the institution of secured debt is efficient . Lawyers com­
monly make this claim in a slightly different form, asserting that the ability 
of firms to give security increases the amount of credit available to the 
firms, but the implicit premise is that the gains to firms and secured 
creditors from additional credit exceed the costs that security may occa­
sionally impose on priority and general creditors . 7 This efficiency 
justification has prevailed ; the accepted wisdom holds that the c urrent 
bankruptcy priority list is normatively desirable . 
5 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1 1  U.S .C.  724(b)(I) (hereinafter cited without cross­
reference as Bankruptcy Act). 
6 Bankruptcy Act § 507. A useful general discussion of bankruptcy distributions ,  though 
dated in detail, is James MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 1 45-54 ( 1 956) . 
7 Security could be efficient in the Pareto-superior or Kaldor-Hicks sense . To perceive the 
difference , suppose that a security interest reduces the risks of a secured creditor by more 
than it increases the risks of unsecured creditors. Consider two cases .  First, all creditors are 
aware of the existence of security; consequently, the secured creditor charges lower interest 
rates than it would have charged had it not taken security, and the unsecured creditors 
charge higher interest rates than they would have charged if no security existed. Since in this 
illustration the benefits of the interest rate reduction exceed the costs of the rate increases by 
assumption , security is (almost) Pareto superior; the debtor and secured creditor are made 
better off by its existence while actual unsecured creditors are as well off as without security 
because they are paid to bear the increased risks that security imposes .  Some risk-averse 
persons, however, may be discouraged from lending. Second, suppose that some unsecured 
creditors charge the same interest rates they would have charged had no secured debt been 
issued because they are too unsophisticated to react appropriately to security. In this case , 
secured debt makes these unsophisticated creditors worse off because their risks increase 
but they receive no additional compensation. Security would nevertheless be efficient in the 
Kaldor-Hicks sense. The gainers from security-the debtor and secured creditor-could 
compensate the losers-the unsophisticated creditors-and remain better off than without 
SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY PRIORITIES 3 
This paper reviews the accepted wisdom. Part I briefly discusses the 
factual context and the law of personal property security. Part II e xplores 
the efficiency justification for the Bankruptcy Acf s favorable treatment of 
personal property secured debt. It argues that this justification is weak 
because efficiency explanations for why firms issue secured debt either 
predict wrongly when it will and when it will not be sold, fail to account 
for the use of security rather than other contractual devices that appar­
ently can accomplish the same ends ,  or fail to show that security reduces 
net social costs. Part III next considers distributional explanations for the 
practice of firms to issue secured debt. It is shown that firms sometimes 
have incentives to issue secured debt to redistribute wealth from particu­
lar unsecured creditors to themselves ,  but that distributional explanations 
for the existence of secured debt are also ultimately unsatisfying. Finally , 
Part IV initially asks what should be done if the efficiency justification for 
current law is rejected. This stance implies that the most appropriate 
reform would be to elevate the priority status in bankruptcy liquidations 
of creditors thought deserving of help. Part IV,  however, also shows that 
the normative theories relevant to the question which bankruptcy priority 
list is preferable are sufficiently primitive to make questionable any such 
case for radically altering present law .  
This essay's principal conclusion, therefore , i s  that scholars and decision 
makers should no longer regard as settled the question which bankruptcy 
priority list is normatively preferable . Much more work must be done to 
make compelling the efficiency defense of current law ,  yet normative 
justifications for altering this law are also poorly developed.  
I .  THE FACTUAL CONTEXT AND THE LAW 
A. The Factual Context 
Firms issue debt on short and long-term bases .  Short-term debt usually 
is payable within a year, whereas long-term debt may be outstanding for 
thirty or more years . Debt of two kinds is issued because firms often have 
cyclical financing needs. If firms issued only long-term debt to finance 
long-term and current needs, they would thus be paying interest for 
short-term financing in periods when no short-term financing was neces­
sary . To avoid this waste , firms finance long-term needs , such as for 
security , by the assumption that security reduces the risks of the secured party by more than 
it increases the risks of the unsecured creditors. The normative efficiency defense of the 
code and Bankruptcy Act would obviously be stronger if secured debt were shown to be 
(almost) Pareto superior to unsecured debt when security was taken. See text at notes 58-60 
infra. 
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capital assets or realty, with long-term debt and short-term needs, such as 
for inventory and raw materials ,  with short-term or current debt . 8 
To be used as collateral for long-term debt, personal property must 
have sufficient longevity to make a satisfactory lien possible . Much per­
sonal property fails to satisfy this requirement . Thus long-term debt is 
commonly secured with real estate and unusually long-lived industrial 
capital such as railroad-rolling stock.  9 Short-term debt is usually secured 
with inventory,  accounts receivable ,  equipment with a relatively short 
life, and negotiable instruments or instruments of credit. 10 This paper' s  
concern with security interests i n  personal property thus requires it to 
focus primarily on short-term debt. The security interests that sometimes 
accompany short-term debt are regulated by the Uniform Commercial 
Code.  
B.  The Law 
Although secured parties always have come first in bankruptcy liq­
uidations,  the law was traditionally believed to have struck a rough bal­
ance between the interests of secured and unsecured creditors . This was 
largely because security, especially personal property security, was 
costly to take , state law having established difficult requirements for 
creating and giving public notice of security interests . 1 1  Consequently, it 
was inconvenient for creditors to put a lien on all of a debtor' s assets ; a 
"cushion of free assets'· was sometimes available to satisfy at least a 
portion of the claims of those creditors thought least able to protect 
themselves-employees,  tenants ,  small-trade creditors . The Uniform 
Commercial Code , which was adopted in the middle 1960s, upset this 
supposed balance . The principal object and chief success of article 9 of 
the code was significantly to reduce the costs accompanying the issuance 
8 " M iddle-term'" debt, outstanding for one to five years , is sometimes secured with heavy 
industrial machinery. This debt seems less significant in volume than the short and long­
term debt that the text discusses .  
9 See William H.  Husband & James C .  Dockeray, Modem Corporation Finance 1 1 3- 14 
(7th ed . 1 972). 
10 A good description of this financing is found in James C. Van Home, Financial Man­
agement and Policy 458-69, 476-77 (4th ed. 1 977). Unsecured trade credit, however, is the 
largest single source of short-term corporate debt. In first quarter 1 976, for example, trade 
debt was 1 06.9 billion dollars, over twice the amount of short-term liabilities to banks.  
Schwartz & Whitcomb, supra note 3,  at  257. See also Van Home, supra, at 437-39. 
11 This law is described in detail in Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property 24-286 ( 1 965). 
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of debt secured by personal property. 12 As a result , secured creditors are 
allegedly taking more and broader security interests than previously. 13 
Article 9 reduces the costs of becoming secured primarily by relaxing 
legal requirements for creating liens . An agreement to give a security 
interest ordinarily must be written, but the writing need contain only 
language of grant and a description of the collateral. 14 The description,
moreover, must only " reasonably identify what is described .  " 15 The code 
also reduces the cost of giving public notice of the existence of a security 
interest . The secured party must file in a public record office a "financing 
statement , "  but this document only has to identify and give the addresses 
of the secured party and debtor and again "reasonably" describe the 
collateral . 16 
Significantly, article 9 also reduces the costs of taking security interests 
in " after-acquired property. "  A creditor who lends on the basis of in-
12 The comment to U . C . C .  § 9- 101  recites: 
•'The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the 
immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less 
cost and with greater certainty . "  
13 U . C . C .  § 9-204, comment 2,  refers to " a  feeling, often inarticulate in the Uudicial] 
opinions [prior to the code], that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber 
all his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the borrower but of 
his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be preserved .. .  The comment states that 
this " premise has much to recommend if' but is rejected in article 9 because secured 
creditors had actually managed to lien everything: "The cushion of free assets was not 
preserved.•• Id. Professor Countryman, a strong critic of the code, had a different view of its 
effect: 
" My theme for today is inspired by what many practitioners and bankruptcy referees tell 
me about the impact of the Uniform Commercial Code upon bankruptcy proceedings. 
They report that with the Code now in effect in every state but Louisiana, more and more 
bankruptcy cases emerge with every scrap of the bankrupfs property covered by some 
sort of a Code security interest so that nothing is left even for the payment of expenses of 
administration. That means, of course, that nothing will be distributed to any unsecured 
creditor, with or without priority. "  
Vern Countryman, Code Security Interests i n  Bankruptcy , 75 Com. L .  J .  269 ( 1970). Profes­
sor Countryman's view of the code's  effect is shared by the leading bankruptcy treatise . See 
2 Collier on Bankruptcy ,  � 363.01  ( 1 5th ed. 1979) . A claim that unsecured creditors should 
receive more favorable treatment in bankruptcy than they now do can be maintained even if 
the code ' s  historical view is correct. 
14 U . C . C .  § 9-203 ( 1 ) .  Agreements to give possessory security interests, in which the 
creditors take physical possession of the collateral , may be oral . Id. Apart from pledges of 
financial instruments, possessory security interests have little commercial significance. 
15 Id. at § 9- 1 10 .  The accompanying comment states that "courts should refuse to follow 
the holdings, often found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that descriptions are in­
sufficient unless they are of the most exact and detailed nature . . . .  " 
16 Id. at § §  9-40 1 ,  9-402. The code is thus a " notice filing" statute, where "the notice itself 
indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a security interest in the 
collateral described. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose 
the complete state of affairs . "  Id. at § 9-402 , comment 2 .  
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ventory or accounts receivable is lending on a wasting asset because the 
inventory or accounts existing when the loan was made will soon disap­
pear. Pre-code law sometimes required a secured party to give public 
notice of its interest in each new item of collateral as the debtor received 
it, 1 7 a costly requirement with such rapid turnover items as inventory and
accounts .  The code , however, allows a financing statement to be effective 
notice of a creditor's interest in collateral existing when the credit was 
extended and in "after-acquired" collatera1 .1s Further. the new Bank­
ruptcy Act, settling a dispute that existe� under prior law ,  makes security
interests in after-acquired property commonly enforceable in bankruptcy 
if the property is inventory or accounts . 19 Most security interests in 
after-acquired property are in collateral of this kind. In addition, article 9 
makes a financing statement effective for five years from the date of 
filing. 20 Thus , if a particular debt is fully paid , the creditor commonly can 
make another loan without giving a second public notice or obtaining a 
new security agreement. 21 These provisions of the code and the Bank­
ruptcy Act rest on the premise that secured debt increases welfare , and 
they implement this premise by making secured debt much less costly to 
buy . Further, because secured creditors come first in bankruptcy liq­
uidations, the code reforms significantly advantage secured at the expense 
of unsecured debt. 22 
17 See id. at § 9-204, comment I. 
18 Id. at § 9-204 (l ). 
19 Bankruptcy trustees had claimed under the old Bankruptcy Act that security interests 
in after-acquired property were preferential, that is, unlawful and hence subject to nullifica­
tion by the trustee. When the debtor took possession of collateral which became subject to a 
previously granted security interest, the debtor in effect was transferring property to the 
creditor for an antecedent debt; the debt was the original credit extension. The circuit courts 
rejected this claim , although on rather questionable grounds. See , e.g . ,  Du Bay v. Williams 
4 1 7  F.2d 1 277 (7th cir. 1 969); Grain Merchants of Indiana v. Union Bank and Savings Co., 
408 F.2d 209 ( 1 969), cert. denied 396 U . S .  827 ( 1 970). The Bankruptcy Act, in § 547(c), 
eliminated all doubt by providing that promptly perfected after-acquired security interests in 
accounts receivable and inventory were not preferential. This development is extensively 
discussed in Anthony T. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired 
Property under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act ,  1 24 U. Pa. L. Rev .  1 10 ( 1 975) .  
20 u.c.c. § 9-403 (2). 
21 A code security agreement may authorize the secured party to make " future advances" 
on the original collateral . U . C . C .  § 9-204 (3). See also id. at § 9-204, comment 5 .  
22 Secured creditors do worse than this description suggests if a possibility exists that the 
debtor may be reorganized rather than liquidated. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Act au­
tomatically stays the enforcement of security interests on the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 
The stay will be terminated in a month if there is no prospect of an effective reorganization, 
but courts are quite lenient in giving debtors time to come up with reorganization plans. 
Even when no reorganization occurs, secured creditors may have to wait six months or more 
to foreclose. While courts are supposed to accord "adequate protection" to secured parties 
during this interim (Bankruptcy Act § 361 ) ,  they may not do so . See text at notes 43-47 infra. 
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II. EFFICIENCY EXPLANATIONS OF SHORT-TERM SECURED DEBT
A.  The Problem 
7 
Firms issue and creditors buy secured debt when the private gains from 
doing so exceed the costs . An efficiency explanation of secured debt must 
show when this is so and also that the social gains from security exceed 
the social costs. The conventional efficiency story is that high risk firms 
prefer issuing security because it enables them to borrow, and creditors 
prefer buying it because it enables them to make loans they otherwise 
would refuse . 23 Security has these properties because it reduces the risks 
of creditors in the event of default , largely by allowing the secured party 
to take the property subject to its security interest and sell it to reduce or 
eliminate the debt . 24 As we have seen,  the power to seize and sell often 
survives the debtor' s bankruptcy .  
This conventional story seems unpersuasive if  creditors (i) can learn of 
and react to the existence of security ; (ii) can calculate risks of default 
reasonably precisely ; (iii) are risk-neutral ; and (iv) have homogeneous 
expectations respecting default probabilities .  To see why this is so, it is 
helpful to consider more precisely just how secured financing reduces a 
creditor' s risks. A lender that extends credit on an unsecured basis looks 
not only to the debtor' s earning capacity for repayment but also to the 
debtor' s assets . When a creditor becomes secured, however, certain (or 
all) assets of the debtor are set aside to help insure that this creditor is 
paid ; in consequence , its chance of collecting its debt are much increased. 
And when these assets are removed from the general pool, the chance that 
the debtor' s unsecured creditors will collect their debts correspondingly 
decreases.  If all creditors are informed ,  the secured creditor will charge a 
lower interest rate because it is secured,  whereas the unsecured creditors 
will charge higher interest rates because the pool of assets available to 
satisfy their claims has shrunk. The debtor' s total interest bill is thus 
Further, if the debtor actually is reorganized, the secured creditor may be required to take 
stock in the new enterprise . While the face value of the stock often equals the value of the 
unpaid debt, the shares of reorganized firms commonly trade at large discounts. See Jerold 
B .  Warner, Bankruptcy ,  Absolute Priority , and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J .  
Financial Econ . 239, 244 n.7  ( 1 977) . Nevertheless, secured creditors seem to do relatively 
better than general creditors, even given the possibility or fact of reorganizations.  
23 A standard authority asserts that firms that pose a nonnegligible risk of default often 
"cannot obtain credit on an unsecured basis . . . .  In order to make a loan, lenders require 
security so as to reduce their risk of loss . "  Van Home , supra note 10,  at 458. This explana­
tion pre supposes that creditors would refuse loans rather than lend unsecured at higher 
interest rates.  The assumption is common but undefended. Its validity is not relevant to the 
analysis about to be made, which focuses on the response of unsecured creditors to the 
existence of security . 
24 u.c.c. §§ 9-503, 9-504. 
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affected by the existence of security . Since the issuance of secured debt
IS Itself costly ,  however, the debtor would be worse off with security tha 
without it. Firms would never sell secured debt.
n 
This unintuitive conclusion is illuminated by a somewhat more formal 
argument. Suppose the interest rate charged by a creditor to be partly a 
function of the risk of default .  The premium that the creditor exacts to 
bear this risk,  called X, can be quantified by the equation: X = p(-P + 
bA ). In the equation ,  p is the probability that the debtor will default and 
-P is the amount of a particular loan that will be lost if default occurs. 
The second term within the parentheses ,  bA, represents the value of the 
assets expected to be available to satisfy the creditor' s  claim at the time of 
default :  b is the ratio of the creditor' s  claim to the then total outstanding 
debt, and A is the value of the total assets then supposed to be available to 
satisfy creditor claims .  25 The equation thus captures the familiar idea that
the risk of default is a function of its probability (p) times the loss which 
default causes ;  this loss is a function of the value of the lost loan (-P) 
offset by the chance that assets can be seized to satisfy the debt (bA). 
Suppose that a firm wants to borrow $200 from two risk-neutral 
creditors (C 1 and C 2) . It has $100 in available assets and both creditors 
assume this value to be stable over time . These creditors also assign a one 
percent probability to default (p = .0 1 ). Creditor C 1 is to lend $11 0  and 
creditor C 2 $90. The firm has only two options, to borrow unsecured or to 
secure C 1• What portion of its interest rate will reflect the risk of default in 
e ither case? If the firm borrows unsecured,p = .0 1 for C 1 , -P = $110;b = 
$ 1 1 0/$200 = .55; A = $ 1 00 .  So X for C 1 = .0 1 (-$ 1 10 + .55 x $100) = 
-$.55. For C 2, B  = $90/$200 = .45. ThusXfor C 2  = (-$90 + .45 x $ 1 00) 
= -$.45. And X C 1 + X C 2 = -$1.00: the possibility of default wil l  cause
creditors to increase interest charges to the firm by $ 1 .00. 
25 Should a firm become bankrupt, its creditors are paid on a pro rata basis: if the firm 
owes $ 1 00 in total, $ 1 0  of which is owed to creditor A, creditor A is entitled to ten percent of 
the firm ' s  assets to satisfy its claim. The text's  equation pre supposes a bankruptcy liquida­
tion because this is what the textual equation grants. If creditor A collected before bank­
ruptcy and before other creditors, however, it might be paid in full. On the other hand, if 
creditor A were last on line in a pre-bankruptcy distribution, it would get nothing. The text's 
equation is thus inaccurate in presupposing a bankruptcy-style liquidation. The equation 
should instead define the expected value of the assets available to a creditor on default by 
use of a set of terms characterizing the likelihoods and probable payoffs of a bankruptcy 
distribution in contrast to a first-come-first-served distribution . The text uses the simpler 
equation because it aids exposition without vitiating the point for which the equation is used. 
Also, institutional arrangements make bankruptcy-style liquidations likely. In particular, 
sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Act require creditors to tum over to the bankrupt 
estate payments received by them shortly before bankruptcy and made while the debtor was 
insolvent. Because of these sections ,  creditors may often anticipate bankruptcy-style liq­
uidations when calculating risks of default . 
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The firm' s  other option is to secure C 1• If this were done , C 1 would 
receive all assets on default .  ThenX for C ,  = .01 (-$110 + $ 1 00) = -$. 1 0: 
taking security reduces the premium C ,  would charge to insure against 
default from -$.55 to -$ . 10. Creditor C 2, however, would get no assets 
on default . In consequence , X for C 2 = . 0 1  ( -$90 + 0) = -$ .90. Again, 
the premiums that C 1 and C 2 will charge because of default sum to $ 1 .00. 
Thus , if the firm secured C 1, its total interest bill would be unaffected: the 
interest premium it would pay because of the possibility of default would 
be $ 1.00, whether C 1 is secured or no one is . The firm, however, would 
not be indifferent between issuing security and not issuing it. Issuing 
security is itself costly because the parties would have to negotiate a 
security agreement , give public notice , and so forth. Call these costs S.
Then, without security , the portion of the firm's  interest charges attribut­
able to the risk that it might default would be $ 1.00. With security , its cost 
would be $ 1 .00 + S. Since S represents a cost to the firm without any 
offsetting gain, the firm would not issue secured debt .  And, to generalize , 
firms would never sell secured debt but would instead pay interest rates 
that reflect their risk category ; high risk firms would pay high interest 
rates (p is greater so X is greater) while low risk firms would pay low 
interest rates .  
This conclusion i s  the logical consequence of  the assumptions made 
above about creditor knowledge , ability , risk neutrality , and homogeneity 
of expectations. Because short-term secured debt is often seen, however, 
something must be going on that is not accounted for in the above analysis 
or the assumptions themselves are too restrictive . Sections B, C, and D of 
this part next consider what else could be going on: Part 11-E then 
explores the consequences of relaxing the assumptions that creditors are 
risk-neutral , can calculate default risks relatively precisely , and have ho­
mogeneous expectations. 26 
B .  Monitoring Costs 
Part II-A purportedly showed that security increases the costs of unse­
cured creditors by as much as it reduces the costs of secured creditors ; in 
26 The assumptions that the text makes are similar to the assumptions underlying the 
famous proof that in a perfect capital market a firm cannot increase its value by altering its 
capital structure . See Haley & Schall, supra note l, at 280. The argument above may be 
thought of as a proof that a firm cannot increase its value by varying the nature of its debt 
instruments. This anal ysis does not depend on the ability of inve stors to arbitrage between 
firms but rather on the ability of a firm's  creditors to vary interest rates with change s in the 
nature of the firm's  debt. If the creditors could not do this, arbitrage possibilities are likely to 
yield the same result. The argument above, unlike the standard irrelevance proof, is robust 
to the existence of corporate taxes since the tax laws permit the deductibility of interest on 
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consequence. firms have no incentive to issue it. The monitoring-cost 
explanation for the existence of secured debt attempts to show how secu­
rity actually can increase the costs of unsecured creditors by less than it 
reduces the costs of secured creditors , even if the assumptions made 
above of creditor knowledge , ability , risk neutrality , and homogeneous 
expectations hold.  2; Recall that interest rates are partially a function of 
the risk of default ,  and that this risk is itself a function of the riskiness of 
the debtor's business.  Suppose a firm borrows money at an interest rate 
that accurately reflects the risk of its enterprise . After the loan is made , 
the firm pursues a higher risk project for which a higher interest rate 
would have been charged .  The firm has thus retroactively reduced the 
interest rate it faces: it is borrowing at a low risk rate for a high risk 
project . Firms with limited shareholder liability sometimes would so act 
because they would capture most of the gains if a high risk project pays off 
but bear only part of the losses if it does not . Creditors would bear the rest 
of these losses .  
Creditors know that debtors have incentives to reduce interest rates 
retroactively by taking greater risks .  To prevent or limit such debtor 
misconduct,  they can (and do) monitor debtors-that is, watch and police 
them. Monitoring, however, is expensive . A security interest is then 
explicable as a device to reduce creditor monitoring costs .  If a creditor is 
fully secured, it need only monitor to ensure that the assets subject to its 
security interest are not dissipated: it need not monitor the debtor' s entire 
business to prevent the debtor from taking risks not justified by the 
operative interest rate . 
The monitoring-cost explanation for the existence of secured debt, as 
so far described,  is similar to the conventional risk-reduction explanation 
analyzed above . It shows how security reduces the costs of the secured 
creditor but ignores the impact of security on the unsecured creditors . 
Monitoring costs aside , these creditors apparently experience cost in­
creases from security that match the cost reductions that security 
generates .  Also , although security may reduce the secured party' s  
monitoring costs,  it seems likely to increase the monitoring costs of unse­
cured creditors . The existence of security raises the expected cost of 
default for unsecured creditors by reducing the available asset pool and 
thus creates incentives for these parties to monitor more extensively . A 
both secured and unsecured debt. A variety of debt instruments do exist, however, and the 
text explores possible explanations for their existence. 
27 Monitoring-cost explanations for the existence of secured debt are found in Thomas H .  
Jackson & Anthony T.  Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors, 88 
Yale L.J.  1 1 43 ( 1 979); and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy , Secured 
Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. Finance 247 ( 1 979). 
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monitoring-cost theory therefore must also explain why the secured 
creditor gains more from security than the unsecured creditors lose from 
it . 28 
A way to show that security can reduce a firm· s net credit costs is to 
focus on the methods by which a firm can behave in a more risky fashion 
after a loan is made . Sometimes ,  taking greater risks requires a firm to 
exchange assets for other assets. A firm that wants to switch from making 
lathes to making amphibious cars , for example ,  will need different 
machinery . A security interest in the firm's property would impede such a 
substitution of assets by drying up the market for the firm's equipment. 
The code provides,  in § 9-306(2), that ··a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale,  exchange or other disposition thereof un­
less the disposition was authorized by the secured party . . . . " In conse­
quence , people would be deterred from purchasing equipment from mis­
behaving firms . Since asset substitution is an important method of be­
having more riskily after a loan is made, security reduces the risk of a 
debtor' s misbehaving. Most significantly ,  it reduces this risk not only for 
secured parties but for anyone who extends credit to the firm. The in­
crease in monitoring costs that unsecured creditors experience as a result 
of security may thus be less than the decrease in monitoring costs that the 
secured party incurs: indeed, where asset substitution is the principal 
method of behaving more riskily ,  the absolute level of monitoring by 
unsecured creditors could decline . 29 
This explanation of the existence of secured debt, however. is unper­
suasive when applied to short-term financing because the kind of 
28 Jackson and Kronman argued that certain groups of creditors-in particular. 
suppliers-can acquire and assess information about the debtor's post-loan behavior at less 
cost than other groups of creditors-in particular. banks-because the former group has 
more knowledge about the debtor" s industry . See Jackson & Kronman . supra note 27. at 
1 1 59-60. They then argued that securing the creditors with relatively high information­
acquisition costs reduces total monitoring costs. The argument is interesting but subject to 
two difficultie s. First. suppliers of inputs to debtors whose affairs are complex may have less 
ability to obtain and evaluate information about the debtors· post-loan behavior than the 
debtors' bankers have. For example. a seller of office machinery to the Ford Motor Com­
pany seems less able to evaluate changes in Ford's  plans to manufacture cars abroad than 
Ford's financial creditors. which study the entire company before making loans. The 
Jackson-Kronman theory thus predicts that suppliers to complex businesses will be secured 
more frequently than suppliers to simple or single-line busine sse s.  Commentators . however, 
do not report observing such a trend. Further. if the debtor maintains its business bank 
account at the bank that finances it, as often occurs, the bank may be able to learn of 
important changes in the debtor's affairs more promptly and in greater detail than could 
other creditors. Second. the Jackson-Kronman argument is subject to many of the difficul­
ties that attend the asset-substitution theory discussed next . 
29 This explanation follows from Smith & Warner. supra note 27, who claim that secured 
debt is issued because it "is one way of precluding asset substitution by borrowers . "  Id. at 
250. 
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monitoring for which security is supposedly a substitute often seems un­
necessary in this case . Suppose that creditors can observe at relatively 
low cost the significant asset substitutions by a debtor that materially alter 
the riskiness of the debtor' s enterprise . A creditor can react to the possi­
bility of such substitutions in two ways: it can monitor its debtor fairly 
extensively to reduce the likelihood of the debtor' s misbehavior, or it can 
rely on the sanction of lost good will to induce the debtor not to mis­
behave . A firm that behaves in a riskier fashion after a loan is made shows 
itself to be untrustworthy, and its ability to obtain future loans is im­
paired . Lost good will would seem of particular concern to a debtor that 
primarily uses short-term financing. Such a firm must enter the credit 
market frequently and is likely to regard the good-will cost from asset 
substitutions as high in relation to the retroactive interest-rate reduction 
that those substitutions produce on e xisting loans .  Thus the creditors 
of such a firm probably would choose to incur the relatively low cost of 
invoking the good-will sanction by observing whether significant asset 
substitutions have occurred, rather than the relatively high cost of polic­
ing to prevent this form of misbehavior. Security interests are expensive , 
however, and seem substitutes only for the high cost version of mon­
itoring-that is ,  policing for pre ventive purposes .  Creditors have an 
incentive to engage in this form of policing during long-term financing 
situations , where the debtor' s good-will costs from misbehavior are rela­
tively less.  The monitoring-cost explanation therefore predicts that firms 
may issue secured debt when much of their financing is long-term but will 
seldom do so when they primarily use short-term credit. The relatively 
large amount of short-term secured debt issued by retailers thus consti­
tutes a serious counterexample to the monitoring-cost theory . 30 
That short-term debt sometimes has many of the characteristics of 
long-term debt is an insufficient response to this difficulty . Short-term 
debt is considered long-term debt for some purposes when a debtor and 
particular creditor form a relatively permanent association. As an exam­
ple, a bank may finance a particular retailer for many years ,  taking secu­
rity interests in its (everchanging) inventory and accounts receivable. 
30 The costs of misbehavior to debtors vary directly with the ease with which potential 
creditors can learn of that misbehavior. In small towns, few institutional lenders exist, and 
communication among these lenders consequently is easier than among lenders in large 
cities .  As a re sult, the good-will sanction is apparently effective against any small-town firm 
that use s primarily short-term financing and contemplates remaining in business for some 
time . Yet such firms sometimes issue short-term secured debt. The monitoring-cost expla-
nation predicts that this practice would seldom occur. Creditors also may monitor to prevent 
fraud. Selling property subject to an inventory security interest to a consumer is permitted, 
for example, but not remitting the agreed portion of the proceeds to the secured creditor is 
prohibited. Security interests apparently would not reduce the risk of such fraud by much, 
and so do not seem substitutes for monitoring directed at it. 
SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY PRIORITIES 13 
Banks , however, extend funds on a periodic basis in such relationships 
and will terminate if the firm behaves more riskily . Moreover, such a 
creditor can conveniently learn of important changes in its debtors· 
businesses .  Thus e ven in these " long-term" financing situations the 
good-will costs of debtor misbehavior seem sufficiently high to make 
questionable the monitoring-cost explanation for the existence of secured 
debt. 
This explanation also fails to hold because the danger of asset substitu­
tions that secured debt is supposedly meant to prevent varies with the 
length of the loan. A short-term creditor would commonly perceive 
significant asset substitutions to be of relatively low probability. Firms, it 
is true , sometimes do significantly alter their affairs during the course of 
their lives ,  but such fundamental changes take time . A creditor holding a 
one-year note , for example , is therefore likely to assume that its debtor 
would be in roughly the same line of work at year' s end . 31 Thus again 
short-term creditors would have little incentive to take security as a sub­
stitute for incurring high monitoring costs . 
To summarize , the monitoring-cost explanation for the existence of 
secured debt will hold when unsecured creditors can freeload on the 
property of security to impede asset substitutions . When such freeloading 
occurs, security reduces the costs of secured creditors by more than it 
increases the costs of unsecured creditors , thereby creating an incentive 
for firms to issue it. Freeloading apparently would not occur, however, 
when firms primarily use short-term financing because short-term 
creditors would seldom need to monitor to reduce the odds of significant 
asset substitutions . The sanction of lost good will would often induce 
debtors not to engage in such substitutions when their financing is primar­
ily short-term, and short-term creditors are likely to perceive asset sub­
stitutions as rare events during the course of their loans.  When security 
does not substitute for monitoring to pre vent misconduct , it neither re­
duces the monitoring costs of those who take it nor benefits those other­
wise disadvantaged by it . The monitoring-cost explanation therefore pre-
31 This statement seems too broad. Retailers sometimes can increase the risk of their 
enterprise relatively easily by varying the nature of their inventory-from children's blocks 
to hula hoops. A security interest in such a firm' s  inventory. however, would not materially 
reduce the risk of this conduct. Inventory security interests permit firms to sell the goods, 
with the security interest shifting to the proceeds of sale. Thus the firm could sell the blocks 
it owned initially, and the security interest would not bar it from replacing them with hula 
hoops .  With short-term loans. therefore , security would not reduce the risk of asset sub­
stitutions in one of the principal cases in which they might arise . Professors Jackson and 
Kronman state that security is more likely to be issued in connection with long-term loans 
than with short-term loans, but do not note the difficulties that this possibility creates for a 
monitoring-cost explanation of short-term secured debt. See Jackson & Kronman, supra 
note 27, at 1 159. 
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diets that firms will seldom issue secured debt when their financing is 
primarily short-term and it is thus seriously embarrassed by the substan­
tial amount of secured debt that retailers issue . 
C . Secured Debt as a Signal 
A second explanation for the existence of secured debt that also is 
consistent with the assumptions made about creditor knowledge , ability , 
risk neutrality , and homogeneity of expectations is that firms issue secu­
rity as a " signal" to creditors of their prospects . Signaling explanations 
for the financing decisions of firms are becoming common and seem 
promising. 32 At this stage in their development, however, signaling mod­
els are unsatisfactory because it is difficult to know whether a particular 
activity is a signal and whether a particular signaling outcome is efficient. 
To perceive the promise and problems of a signaling explanation for the 
issuance of secured debt, first suppose that at a given time firms seek to 
finance a set of projects whose outcomes are highly variable .  Firms know 
the " quality' '-for example,  the outcome mean and variance-of their 
own projects , but creditors cannot distinguish among firms on the basis of 
quality . This asymmetry of information could occur because the quality of 
a particular project is a function of facts and prospects that outsiders can 
observe only with great difficulty . Further, the firm has an incentive to 
overestimate the likelihood of favorable outcomes . In this circumstance ,  
interest rates in  the loan market would reflect average project quality . 
Moreover, were the market to set interest rates that reflect a relatively 
high average quality (higher than the average risk of projects) , firms would 
supply large numbers of low quality projects. This is because firms with 
low quality projects could borrow at rates that reflected risks below the 
actual risks their projects faced; such firms would make substantial gains 
at the expense of creditors . Creditors , however, are aware of this possi­
bility and , when they lack information about the quality of particular 
projects, will suppose average project quality to be relatively low. In this 
32 See Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy , and '"the Bird in 
the Hand" Fallacy,  10 Bell J. Econ. 259 ( 1 979) (explaining the issuance of dividends as a 
signal to creditors of a firm's  owners' true estimate of future earnings); Stephen A .  Ross, 
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 Bell J .  
Econ. 2 3  ( 1 977) (same); Hayne E .  Leland & David H .  Pyle , Informational Asymmetries, 
Financial Structure , and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. Finance 371 (1977) (explaining the 
equity position that a firm's owners take as a signal to creditors of the owners' true estimate 
of the profitability of the firm's projects). See also, Stephen A. Ross, Some Notes on 
Financial Incentive-Signalling Models ,  Activity Choice, and Risk Preference s ,  33 J .  Finance 
777 ( 1 978) . The evidence relevant to the dividend-signaling explanation seems inconclusive . 
See Thomas Copeland & J .  Fred Weston , Financial Theory and Corporate Policy 359-62 
( 1 979). 
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event, firms with projects of higher quality than the market average could 
not get credit on accurate terms. These firms thus have an incentive to 
inform creditors of-that is , to " signal"-their relative status. 
An effective signal must enable its observers to sort out the signalers by 
some criterion that the observers consider relevant . This signaling 
property probably exists in credit markets if the cost of signaling a firm's  
risk status declines as  the quality of the firm' s projects increases .  This is  
because , if  project quality were uncorrelated with signaling costs , firms 
with low quality projects would send out signals of high quality and 
creditors would learn to disregard the signal as a mark of quality. 
A security interest might be such an effective signal . Security interests 
restrict future borrowing opportunities, give secured creditors greater 
leverage over firm behavior, and make it more difficult for a firm to re­
schedule debts in the event of hard times .  A firm willing to encumber its 
assets is, thus , "s ignaling" that, in its view, its prospects justify these 
potential costs. Further, signaling costs apparently vary inversely with 
project quality because they are partly a function of the likelihood that the 
firm will experience financial difficulty. A firm likely to earn -nigh profits 
may worry l ittle about the future restrictions on its ability to borrow that a 
security interest may create or about the power that a security interest 
gives to a creditor to influence firm decisions if no profits are realized.  
Firms expecting not to do well ,  on the other hand , may regard the ex­
pected costs of issuing secured debt as high because those costs could 
well be incurred. The apparent property of secured debt to communicate 
accurately to creditors a firm's true estimate of its expected earnings 
indicates that the existence of secured debt may be explained as a signal­
ing phenomenon. The information conveyed by the issuance of secured 
debt enables firms to borrow on terms that more accurately reflect their 
risk classes .  
This explanation i s  plausible if creditors actually have an incentive to 
use the signal over time and firms have an incentive to signal correctly. To 
perceive the circumstances under which these conditions may be met, 
suppose that Z is an unobservable variable reflecting the project quality of 
a particular firm. This variable has the property that , if firm one has a 
higher quality project than firm two , Z 1 > Z2• Let Y be the signal that firms 
send for project quality . Creditors initially believe , for the reasons given 
above , that a higher Y-a security interest that encumbers more assets or 
encumbers assets for longer periods of time-correlates positively with 
higher quality. For example, creditors initially believe that a firm that 
signals Y, has project quality Z,. If such a firm would actually maximize 
profits by signaling Y, when it has quality Z,, the creditors' bel iefs are 
confirmed. In this case , the market will reach a " signaling equilibrium" : 
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creditors will use the signal because they attribute informational content 
to it that their experience confirms and firms have an incentive to signal 
correctly .  
A relatively simple example shows that such a signaling equilibrium 
might occur. 33 Suppose that two groups of firms exist. those with low 
quality projects (Group I) and those with high quality projects (Group II) .  
It costs a firm in Group I $ Y to grant a particular security interest and a 
firm in Group II $ Y/2 to issue the same security interest .  High quality 
firms in Group II have lower signaling costs if, as argued above, these 
costs vary inversely with project quality . Creditors in this illustration 
initially believe that a firm that gives a security intere st of type Y' is risky 
enough to require an interest charge of $10 for its loan while a firm that 
grants a security interest of type Y" is sound enough to j ustify an interest 
charge of $5 for the same loan . Given these creditor beliefs ,  Group I firms 
will not grant security interests of type Y'iif 10 < 5 + $Y. Group II firms 
will grant a security interest of type Y" if 5 + $Y/2 < 10. Combining these 
inequalities ,  when $5 < $Y < $10, creditor beliefs about project quality 
are confirmed.  For example,  if creditors initially associate a high quality 
project with a security interest of type r' that would cost Group I firms $ Y 
= $7 to grant, they will observe in the market that firms with low quality 
projects signal Y' and firms with high quality projects signal Y'', a 
confirming set of signals .  34 
This illustration is too simple because of the crudity of creditor beliefs 
and because of the discreteness of the intervals chosen: project risks 
supposedly are such that interest charges of $5 or $10 only are justified.  
Nevertheless, equilibrium signaling schedules have been shown to exist 
when more sophisticated beliefs are attributed to creditors and less 
"lumpy" variables are assumed.35 These schedules have the property that 
a continuum of prices (here interest rates) exists , conditional upon the level 
of the signal , such that when firms acting as price takers choose their 
maximizing signal level,  creditors find that their quality forecasts are 
confirmed.  Such a schedule might look like curve FF in Figure 1. 
33 The example is derived from A. M .  Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer 
in Hiring and Related Screening Processes 1 6-20 ( 1974). 
34 For those interested in how the numbers work out, a firm in Group I would not signal Y"
when $Y = $7 because it would cost this firm $7 to send the signal while the signal would 
generate an interest-rate reduction of only $5 (from $ 1 0  to $5). A firm in Group II would 
signal Y" because its signaling cost is Y/2 = $3.50 and the signal yields a rate reduction of $5 . 
A Group II firm would not issue a security interest that would cost it more than $3.50 
because creditors in the example above charge $5 to all firms that signal Y" or more; thus 
sending a signal costing more than $3 .50 would generate no gains. 
35 See, e . g . ,  Leland & Pyle, supra note 32; John G .  Riley , Informational Equilibrium, 47 
Econometrica 33 1 ( 1979) . 
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In Figure 1 ,  the level of the signal-the breadth and length of a security 
interest-is plotted on the horizontal axis and project quality-· the firm's  
prospects-on the vertical axis.  To show that only one signaling schedule 
can exist in equilibrium, first consider a second schedule, GG. A firm with 
quality level t would signal Y', as would a firm with quality level Z* , 
where t > Z* ; thus the signal Y' would be useless to creditors . Put 
another way, the assumption that signaling cost varies inversely with 
project quality is violated by the existence of the schedule GG, for that 
schedule permits low quality firms to " mimic" the signals of high quality 
firms:  both such firms here would signal Y' . Now consider the schedule 
HH. A firm with quality Z* could signal this to creditors by taking a 
security interest of the value Y' (along FF) or Y" (along HH) ,  but Y' < Y". 
Firms thus would prefer to be on FF because the same level of quality can 
be signaled at lower cost on this schedule than on any schedule to the right 
of FF in Figure 1 .  Thus an equilibrium-signaling schedule in a given credit 
market must be unique . 
To summarize the signaling explanation , firms have an incentive to 
issue secured debt as a way of sorting themselves out by risk class if 
creditors take the existence and level of secured debt as indicia of firm 
profitability . Creditors may hold such beliefs because secured debt is 
more costly for firms to issue when their projects are of low quality . 
Further, profit-maximizing firms have an incentive to signal in a way that 
confirms creditor beliefs about the relationship between the existence and 
level of security and the prospects of firms . 
This signaling explanation is promising but , unfortunately, has serious 
difficulties .  A security-interest signal may be ambiguous because it re-
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quires creditors to know the risk preferences of firm owners . 36 To see 
why this is so , suppose two firms have identical prospects-Z 1 = Z2.  The 
owners of firm one are risk preferers ; they are relatively unconcerned 
about granting broad security interests because they count the marginal 
benefits from potential gains more heavily than the marginal costs from 
potential losses .  Firm two' s  owners , however, are risk-averse ; they take 
seriously the costs that a broad security interest could impose on them. 
Firm one , consequently,  could issue a broader security interest than firm 
two-signal Y1 > Y2-although in fact Z1 = Z2• The security-interest
signal would then be useless and creditors would not rely on it. The 
signal ing-cost explanation for the existence of secured debt thus rests on 
the seemingly strong assumption that owners of firms in any given market 
have roughly similar attitudes toward risk .  
Whether a security-interest-signaling equilibrium increases welfare is  
hard to know. Firms will s ignal if  their gains from doing so exceed their 
costs, but whether the social gains exceed the social costs is a separate 
question . The private gain to a firm from signaling, assuming creditors 
use security-interest signals ,  is the reduction in the interest rate the sig­
nal generates .  The social gain is that the signal helps produce better 
" matches' " between creditors and firms : the amount and cost of credit 
more closely approximate their · ' true ' '  levels with signaling than without 
it. If a security-interest signal , however, actually tells creditors l ittle about 
the riskiness of firm projects , too much signaling could occur in equilib­
rium: the total costs that firms incur in sending signals will exceed the 
total social gain generated by more appropriate credit extensions. Secu­
rity interests seem relatively crude devices for information transmission 
so the chance that they actually reduce welfare is nonnegligible .  But the 
important point is the difficulty in knowing whether too much signaling 
will occur in equilibrium. Finding out requires a comparison of the accu­
racy of creditor assessments of firms·  projects in a no-signaling world with 
the assessments that are made by use of security-interest signals .  At this 
stage , no theory is suggestive of the outcome of such a comparison, in 
general or in particular cases ,  nor have the relevant facts been obtained.  
Answering the welfare question is difficult for another reason: signaling 
equilibria often appear unstable ,  and this instability may make unfeasible 
36 Ross makes the same criticism of Leland and Pyle' s  model, which asserts that the 
equity positions owners take in their own firms operate as signals of the owners· true 
predictions of their firms· prospects. See Discussion, 32 J .  Finance 4 1 2  ( 1 977). Deciding 
whether signaling occurs in real-world markets is difficult .  For illustrations of recent at­
tempts, see James W. Albrecht , A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis ( 1 979) 
(Discussion paper #28, Columbia Univ . ,  Dep't of Econ . )  (educational screening) : John G.  
Riley,  Testing the Educational Screening Hypothe sis, J .  Pol. Econ . (forthcoming). 
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e ven rough comparisons between signaling and no-signaling worlds.  3 7  To 
understand how signaling equilibria break up, suppose that all projects in 
the market will earn positive profits at the highest interest rates charged .  
Firms at the lower end of  the market distribution for quality-those with 
the riskiest projects-signal X. With a rising quality distribution-higher 
quality firms grant more extensive security interests-the lower end firms 
actually form an interval , say from ?. the lowest quality , to i, with
average quality being Z0 • All these firms will signal f. however, because 
the costs of signaling a greater Y would exceed the gains for those firms 
whose quality level is above but quite close to �- For firms that signal [, 
the market interest rate is H .  Suppose that a creditor offers an interest rate 
justified by the average quality level in the z . . .  t interval to any firm that 
signals X: the lender bids R0 which correlates with Z0 • This creditor would 
make no gains from firms within the interval because it gets just that 
average quality on its debtors' projects that the interest rate justifies .  But 
because the distribution of firms by quality does consistently rise , some 
firms whose quality is just above the interval ? to i will exist who
nevertheless signal X: for these firms also , the costs of signaling their true 
quality level-say Z'-are too high. These relatively high quality firms
will also borrow from our creditor because R0 < R ;  and their appearance 
raises the average quality of this creditor' s debtors . Thus a creditor who 
bids an interest rate slightly below the market minimum is assured of 
doing better than it would have done if it offered the minimum rate . The 
lower bid generates debtors with an average project quality greater than 
the bid actually justifies .  The signaling equilibrium therefore "unravels 
37 Economists attempt to establish the nature of equilibria in their models because an 
equilibrium is a prediction of what actual market outcomes look like. If an analyst cannot 
characterize the feature s that a particular market would have in equilibrium , he will have 
difficulty assessing the welfare implications of the features he actually observes .  For exam­
ple , if he lacks a theory of what a credit market looks like in competitive equilibrium, he will 
find it hard to decide whether the particular credit markets that he sees are behaving com­
petitively or not. The instability properties of signaling equilibria are now well known. See 
Riley ,  supra note 35 ; John G. Riley, Competitive Signalling, 10 J. Econ. Theory 1 74 ( 1 975); 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J .  Econ. 629 ( 1 976). The eq.uilib­rium concept employed in all of these models is the Nash equilibrium. A system will be in a 
Nash equilibrium if each actor in it maximizes expected utility by pursuing his or her chosen 
strategy given that all other actors continue to pursue their chosen strategies.  In this circum­
stance, the system is at an equilibrium . for no one in it has an incentive to do other than what 
he is doing. A set of strategies could not constitute an equilibrium if at least one actor has an 
incentive to vary his strategy , given that other actors continue to pursue their strategies .  For 
a further explanation of the Nash equilibrium concept, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis , 1 27 U .  Pa. L. Rev.  630, 640-41 ( 1979). 
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from the bottom, " because creditors and firms have an incentive to depart 
from it at this point .  38 
A signaling equil ibrium may also unravel from within . 39 Suppose that a 
firm with quality Zi above the market minimum signals Yi . A creditor who 
offers an interest rate equal to the average in the interval Zi . . .  Zi, where 
z; < zi, will get some firms whose quality is greater than Zi for the reasons 
described above . The creditor will also get firms whose quality is below 
the z;zi average , however, for at the lower rate these relatively low 
quality firms will benefit from raising their signals to the level Yi . Whether 
the creditor has an incentive to break the equilibrium from within there­
fore depends on the slope of the distribution of quality by firms . If the 
number of high quality firms is increasing rapidly enough around the 
signaling point Yi , the creditor will attract more good firms than bad ones 
with its lower bid. Internal unraveling is thus a function of a factor that is 
hard to characterize or observe , the slope of the distribution of project 
3 8  This argument may be m ade clearer with Figure 2.  In the market,  an inte.rest rate of E. in 
Figure 2-B is paid to creditors who signal Y. Suppose a creditor bids R°. which is justified by 
the average quality Z0 in the interval Z . -:- . t in Figure 2-A. This creditor makes no extra 
profits from firms in the interval, because the average quality of their projects correlates with 
a bid of R0• The bid, however, is attractive to firms in the interval t to j ust before Z' because 
R0 < B. ;  these higher quality firms also signal [ because the costs to them of signaling Y' are 
not justified by the difference between R ' ,  the rate for Y' . and R .  These relatively high 
quality firms also borrow from the creditor that bids R° ' so the average quality of the firms 
this creditor gets is above Z0• The bid R0 thus ensures the creditor a net gain. This creditor 
need not be particularly astute ; naive experimentation by creditors, who vary their bids out 
of ignorance of the market price or to see what happens, could produce equilibrium-breaking 
bids. The unraveling the text and this note describe occurs because the signaling variable is 
supposedly discontinuous; that is, not every slight increase in project quality is matched by a 
corresponding increase in the signaling level.  If security-interest signals are discontinuous, a 
particular signal will apply to a range of quality levels ,  as the unraveling argument assumes. 
Security-interest signals are likely to have some discontinuity because of the difficulty of 
precisely matching increases in the collateral subject to them with increases in the quality of 








'f. y' y 
FIGURE 2 
39 See Riley, supra note 35, at 343-46. 
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quality b y  firms .40 To summarize , i n  consequence of the frequent instabil­
ity of signaling equilibria at and above the lower bound, it is difficult to 
compare , e ither in theory or by empirical investigation based on theory , a 
particular signaling market with its no-signaling equivalent . Yet without 
such a comparison, assertions that signaling is efficient are essentially ad 
hoc . 
These criticisms of the signaling explanation make two points.  First , 
signaling may not account for the existence of secured debt because a 
security interest might be an insufficiently clear signal . Second, if firms 
issue secured debt as a signal , the social gains from such signaling have 
not been shown to exceed the social costs: also, such a showing seems 
hard to make because of the difficulty of testing signaling hypotheses 
empirically . Taken together,  the criticisms demonstrate the present un­
persuasiveness of a conclusion that security interests are efficient signals .  
D .  Staggering Debt 
The last serious efficiency explanation for the existence of secured debt 
consistent with the assumptions made above about creditor knowledge, 
40 Leland & Pyle, supra note 32, claim that finance market equilibria will not unravel at 
the lower bound. Id. at 379 n . 1 1 .  To see their argument, Figure 1 should be redrawn as in 
Figure 3 .  Figure 3 presupposes that firms bring projects to market but do not signal , because 
at prevailing interest rates their projects are of such poor quality that the costs of signaling 
exceed the gains .  These firms are on the signaling schedule FF slightly to the left of the Z 
axis . When a creditor in this circumstance offers a new bid to the low quality firms that are 
signaling I (bids R° < fi), its bid will cause some of the nonsignaling firms to signal f; for at 
R0 the projects of these firms will earn positive returns given the signal I. In consequence of 
the potential appearance of these low quality firms, a creditor who bids R0 is not assured of 
making gains because it will attract below average as well as above average firms. Leland 
and Pyle thus assert that the creditor has no incentive to break the signaling equilibrium by 
bidding R0 ; the equilibrium will not unravel from below . This assertion is inaccurate . If low 
quality non signaling firms actually are in the market and would signal Y if a creditor bids R0,
the "end point" is actually a midpoint, and whether the equilibrium would unravel depends 
on the slope of the quality distribution. Specifically, if the slope were such that a bid of R0
would attract more high than low quality firms, unraveling would occur. Leland and Pyle are 
correct, however, in observing that if the supply of low quality nonsignaling firms is 
sufficiently elastic around the lower end point, a signaling equilibrium will not necessarily 
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ability , risk neutrality , and homogeneity of expectations follows from the 
premise that properly staggered debt can increase profits . Suppose a firm 
knows it will have credit needs over time and also knows reductions in the 
interest rates of secured debt will trigger corresponding increases in inter­
est rates by unsecured creditors . The firm may borrow on a secured basis 
and later borrow on an unsecured basis . By so doing, it pays lower inter­
est rates early and higher interest rates late . If the return earned by in­
vesting the difference between the secured and the unsecured interest 
rates exceeds the costs of granting security , the firm will issue secured 
debt. Such secured debt would also be efficient because the firm benefits 
while no one loses .  
This staggering-debt explanation generates two predictions that appear 
inconsistent with the facts:  firms whose debt frequently turns over will 
seldom issue secured debt, and firms that can profit from staggered bor-
rowing will issue secured debt as early in their lives as possible . Respect-
ing the first prediction, if a firm turns over its debt frequently ,  as when it 
continuously buys goods on credit, there would be little opportunity to 
earn a return sufficient to justify the cost of issuing security because the 
firm would experience higher interest rates from unsecured creditors quite 
promptly .  Relatively small retailers seem to have frequent credit needs, 
yet such firms sometimes borrow on a secured basis. Respecting the 
second prediction , if a firm can earn positive profits by investing the 
interest rate differential between secured and unsecured debt , it has an 
incentive to issue secured debt first and later borrow unsecured.  In this 
way it can capture these profits as soon as possible .  Systematic patterns 
of firms '  borrowing according to the pattern of issuing secured debt first 
have not yet been observed.  Since the staggering-debt explanation yields 
predictions that the very sparse data apparently fail to support , its validity 
is questionable .  
E .  Risk Aversion , Uncertainty , and Heterogeneous Expectations 
1 .  Risk A version . Security interests might increase welfare if they 
helped shift risks from more to less risk-averse creditors . Whether they 
play a significant role in performing this function is problematic . To see 
the relevance of a risk-aversion explanation,  recall that the argument 
respecting why security would not reduce a firm' s  net credit costs presup-
posed that all creditors were risk-neutral . In the illustration in Part II-A, 
when neither C 1 nor C 2 were secured, they priced the default risk at its 
actual value , $ .55 and $ .45 respectively .  Suppose instead that C 1 were
risk-averse ; to bear a $ .55 risk it would charge the debtor $ .60. Let C 2 
remain risk-neutral ; it would charge a risk' s  actual value whatever the 
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level of the risk .  Under these new assumptions, the interest-rate increase 
attributable to the risk of default when neither creditor is secured would 
be $ 1 .05. When C 1 became secured, its risk in the illustration above 
dropped to $. 1 0  while C2' s  risk rose to $.90. Since risk aversion generally 
varies with the degree of risk, suppose that C 1 would only charge $.01 for 
bearing a $. 1 0  risk. By securing the risk-averse creditor-C 1-and shift­
ing risks to the risk-neutral creditor-C 2-the firm's  net credit cost falls
by $.04, from $ 1 .05 to $ 1 .01 .  This decline is a net welfare gain since the 
firm is made better off but no one is made worse off. And, to generalize , 
security is used to reduce a firm's  net credit costs by shifting risks from 
more to less risk-averse creditors . 
The risk-aversion explanation seems plausible, but has two serious 
difficulties .  First , it fails to show why creditors respond to risk aversion 
by taking security . Taking security is costly, so risk-averse creditors may 
prefer to buy low risk debt directly rather than buy high risk debt and 
reduce its risk by mortgages .  Since much low risk debt exists , the risk­
aversion explanation is incomplete . 41 Second, given what is known about 
the goals that corporate managers actually pursue , explaining the exis­
tence of secured debt as a response to differential levels of risk aversion 
among creditors seems either mistaken or tautological . To perceive the 
nature of this difficulty , recall that risk aversion in individuals is explained 
by the diminishing marginal utility of money theory . This theory provides 
that each additional dollar a person receives generates less utility for him 
than the addition of earlier dollars did because later dollars are used to 
satisfy less urgent needs.  Because money has diminishing marginal utility , 
a person seeking to maximize his or her expected utility would not be 
indifferent between equal prospects of gain or loss . The person would lose 
more utility if the loss materialized than he or she would gain if prospects 
were successful .  That is , for an ordinary person the expected utility of 
being given an equal chance of winning or losing the same amount would 
be less than the utility of not gambling.  The assumptions that individuals 
maximize expected utility and that money has diminishing marginal utility 
thus imply individual risk aversion ,  not risk neutrality . 
Many of a firm's  business creditors , however, are likely to be corpo­
rations that are operated by managers whose scope of operation is to 
some extent independent of shareholder preferences .  What utility func­
tion these managers maximize is a controversial and unresolved question. 
Economists and lawyers commonly assume that the managers try to 
41 Jackson & Kronman, supra note 27, also criticize the risk-aversion explanation on this 
ground. See id. at 1 152,  n .  39. The criticism may not be fully justified, however, because 
creditors often choose to hold assets of different risk classes as a means of diversifying their 
portfolios .  
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maximize the market value of the corporation' s  stock. This goal implies 
risk neutrality . If managers are assumed to maximize share values,  the 
risk-aversion e xplanation thus predicts that corporate creditors wil l  be 
like C 2 in the example above . Being risk-neutral they will lend unsecured 
at relatively high interest rates so individual risk-averse creditors such as 
C 1 can become secured at relatively low interest rates .  The substantial 
amount of short-term secured debt held by banks and finance companies 
thus constitutes a troublesome counterexample to the risk-aversion ex­
planation . Suppose next that the assumption of corporate managers 
maximizing share values is abandoned .  There is no other widely accepted 
or easily defensible assumption of what goals corporate managers pursue 
to take its place . Given this theoretical and empirical vacuum, an argu­
ment that security is a response to differential levels of risk aversion 
among creditors becomes tautological : it proves the existence of security 
by presupposing differential levels of risk aversion, and it proves the 
existence of differential levels of risk aversion by showing that security 
exists . 
With the positivist analysis in this state, two responses seem sensible.  
First, one can assume that corporate managers maximize share values .  
This response calls the risk-aversion explanation seriously into question 
because the corporate creditors that firms often have are then supposed to 
be risk-neutral , yet they sometimes take security . Second, one can treat 
the question what utility function corporate managers attempt to 
maximize as open, which implies that whether corporate creditors are 
risk-averse remains to be proved. With this question open,  however, the 
risk-aversion explanation for the existence of security is not compelling. 
2 . Uncertainty . Security interests also could increase welfare if they
reduced creditor uncertainty . In this connection, the assumption made in 
Part II-A above that little uncertainty exists seems unrealistic : a creditor 
calculating the risk of default must predict the ratio of its debt to existing 
debt at the time of default as well as the size of the then available asset 
pool , but these predictions are difficult to make precisely . A security 
interest may reduce this uncertainty because secured creditors have only 
to know whether assets will exist to satisfy their claims.  Thus the lower 
intere st rates that accompany secured debt may partly be a function of the 
greater certainty that security generates . Since the existence of secured 
debt seems not to increase uncertainty for a firm' s other creditors, that 
fraction of the secured creditors ' lower interest charge attributable to a 
reduction in uncertainty is a net gain to the firm.  Firms, the explanation 
goes ,  issue secured debt to capture this gain . 
This explanation, however, generates predictions that the facts seem 
not to confirm and fails to explain why creditors respond to uncertainty by 
taking security . First ,  the uncertainty explanation predicts that, other 
SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY PRIORITIES 25 
things equal , firms will issue as much secured debt as they can ; for if 
security always generates net interest-rate reductions, firms always have 
an incentive to capture them. Firms,  however, often seem not to issue as 
much secured debt as their assets would justify . This counterexample 
cannot be dismissed by arguing that the costs of taking security some­
times exceed the gains of a reduction in uncertainty and sometimes do 
not. In the absence of further evidence , such a response is tautological . It 
asserts only that security will exist when security is efficient-its gains in 
reducing uncertainty exceed its costs-and will not exist when it is 
inefficient . 
Second, the uncertainty explanation predicts that creditors are less 
likely to take security in the assets of firms that will probably be reor­
ganized rather than liquidated upon insolvency.  42 When the possibility of 
reorganization is nonnegligible ,  the Bankruptcy Act may increase uncer­
tainty by reducing the ability of creditors to calculate the expected value 
of security interests in the event of default .  Initially, federal law automati­
cally stays foreclosure when a bankruptcy petition is filed . 4� The stay' s 
purpose is to allow time to explore the possibility of reorganization ,  with 
losses to the secured creditors supposedly being avoided by giving them 
" adequate protection" -interim cash payments or replacement liens 
based on the collateral ' s  worth .44 To provide such protection, the collat­
eral must of course be valued. The act ,  however, chooses no valuation 
standard, leaving the matter entirely at the bankruptcy court ' s  discretion .  
A court that i s  permitted t o  choose between standards a s  disparate as 
forced liquidation or full going-concern value when deciding what the 
collateral is worth is likely to be inftuenced-indeed· is encouraged to be 
inftuenced-by "equitable considerations,  "45 such as assisting unsecured 
creditors and equity holders by preserving the estate · s assets as well as 
42 Smith and Warner also assert that the probability of security varies inversely with the 
probability of reorganization , but rest this claim on the ability of bankruptcy courts to 
"prohibit the bondholders from taking possession of the property . "  Smith & Warner. supra 
note 2, at 19.  Bankruptcy courts, however, are required to compensate bondholders for this 
loss, so Smith and Warner must go on to show that the compensation will be inadequate. 
Bankruptcy lawyers do believe this often to be true . Moreover, Smith and Warner do not ask 
whether the Bankruptcy Act's tendency to increase uncertainty also reduces the incentive of 
creditors to take security when their debtors are likely to be reorganized . 
43 Bankruptcy Act § 362(a)(4). 
44 Bankruptcy Act §§ 362, 36 1 .  
45 The Senate explained the decision not to put valuation criteria in the statute as follows: 
" Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in every case, 
forced sale liquidation value or full going concern value. There is wide latitude between 
those two extremes although forced sale liquidation value will be a minimum . . . .  [T]he 
determination of which entity should be entitled to the difference between the going 
concern value and the liquidation value must be based on equitable considerations arising 
from the facts of the case . "  
Bankruptcy Reform Act o f  1 978, Senate Rep. N o .  95-989, 95th Cong. 2 d  Sess . ,  a t  5 4  ( 1 978) . 
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the possibility of successful reorganization.  Because the bank t , d " 
· 
· 
rup cycourt s 1scretlon is so unconfined, the value of the "protection" t secured party during the unspecified period in which foreclosure is sta 0 
�
is hard to predict ex ante . If a reorgan�zation is attempted, secured pa
�i�s commonly are offered stock or debt m the new enterprise . The value f
this property when security is taken is also hard to predict for two re�­
sons .  First, the debtor will never have operated in its reorganized form 
and it is thus hard to assess the expected value of claims on its earnings '.
Second, the value of the stock or new debt offer that equity holders and
unsecured creditors will make to secured parties to obtain their consent to
a reorganization is likely to be influenced by (i) the debtor' s  actual pros­
pects ; (ii) the desire of the holders of equity and unsecured debt to give
the debtor a second chance ; and (iii) the ability of the secured parties to
obstruct the reorganization .  These factors too are quite difficult to assess 
when the initial credit extension is made . 
Finally, creditors cannot significantly increase their ability to calculate 
the expected value of security in the event of default by planning ab initio 
to dissent from reorganization plans . Dissenters must receive cash or liens 
as compensation for the loss of rights under their security agreements ,46 
but granting such compensation also requires bankruptcy courts to value 
the collateral . In addition, the present value of the periodic cash payments 
that bankruptcy courts are authorized to make to dissenting secured par­
ties must equal the "present value" of the security. A court cannot cal­
culate the requisite payments without setting a discount rate , however, 
and bankruptcy courts have wide discretion, unconfined by statute or 
legislative history , in choosing the "appropriate" rate . In consequence , 
creditors will seldom be able to increase significantly their ability to cal­
culate the present values of security interests , and hence the present 
values of their debt holdings, by planning to dissent from reorganization 
plans should their debtors become insolvent .47 
Creditors of such firms as large concerns or common carriers, which are 
likely to be reorganized on default , are thus apt to have difficulty , when 
they take secured debt , in knowing what their security wil l  ultimately be 
worth. The return from a secured loan may be as difficult to calculate ex 
ante as the return from an unsecured loan . Although security may be 
valuable to these creditors for other reasons , its existence is unlikely to 
generate the gains from a reduction of uncertainty on which the uncer­
tainty explanation rests. This explanation thus predicts that security is 
4 6  Bankruptcy Act § §  I 1 29(b)(i) and I 1 29(b)(2)(A). 
47 Valuation difficulties in reorganization contexts have become notorious. See Victor 
Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance Cases and Materials 1 37-42, 1 58- 163 
(2nd ed.  1 979) . 
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more likely to be taken when liquidation is the probable outcome of de­
fault. Such a prediction is best verified by a statistical study, but lacks 
support in the impressionistic evidence . Dealing with the " problem" of 
secured creditors , for example ,  is one of the principal subjects of reor­
ganization law ,  thus implying the frequency of security in this circum­
stance .  And the debtors sometimes are firms that creditors apparently can 
foresee are unlikely to be liquidated promptly on default . 48 
Respecting the second difficulty with the uncertainty explanation, loan 
covenants seem substitutes for security interests in reducing creditor un­
certainty ; these covenants require firms to maintain working capital above 
specified amounts ,  limit the extent to which firms can become claim­
holders in other businesses ,  restrict dividend payments, and require the 
maintenance of sinking funds ,  all of which help to ensure sufficient asset 
. .  cushions" so as to simplify significantly calculating risks of default . 49 If 
security is taken because it leads to a reduction in uncertainty , this must 
be because it sometimes performs the function of reducing uncertainty 
more cheaply than do loan covenants . No explanations of when and why 
security is cheaper than loan covenants exist, however. In sum, because 
of apparent counterexamples and the failure to explain why security is 
taken, the uncertainty theory is also unsatisfactory given the evidence 
that now exists. 
3. Heterogeneous Expectations Respecting Default . The argument in
Part II-A that security fails to generate net gains for a firm presupposed 
that the firm· s creditors assigned equal probabilities to default .  If this 
assumption is relaxed , security may increase welfare . To see why, recall 
that the premium which creditors charge for bearing the risk of default 
was represented by the equation X = p ( -P + bA ). The example above 
assumed that the debtor had $ 1 00 in available assets and wished to borrow 
$ 1 10 from creditor C 1 and $90 from C 2 ;  each creditor assigned a .0 1  prob­
ability to default .  Suppose instead that C 1 chose a .02 default probability . 
Then, using the equation ,  if both creditors are unsecured,  the premium 
they wil l  charge because of the risk of default is $ 1 .55 , but if C 1 is secured 
the total premium drops to $ 1 . 10 .  And to generalize , it is always efficient 
for the firm to secure the creditor that assigns the highest probability to 
default .  
48 For example, bondholders in common carrier bankruptcies are often secured. See , e.g. , 
New Haven Inclusion Cases,  399 U . S .  392 ( 1 970). See also In re Yale Express, 384 F. 2d 990 
(2d cir. 1 967) .  
49 A thorough description of loan covenants is  contained in Smith & Warner. supra note 2.  
The existence of loan covenants as substitutes for security interests also cuts against the 
validity of the monitoring-cost explanation. See text at notes 27-3 1 supra . 
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This e xplanation initially seems plausible because a firm· s creditors 
could assign different probabilities to the likelihood of default. The prob­
ability that a firm will default is a function,  inter alia , of the length and size 
of loans and not all of a firm' s  debt is likely to be of the same length and 
size . The heterogeneous-expectations explanation, however, is difficult to 
confirm with the sparse data that now exist. The explanation predicts that 
long-term or large debt will be secured more frequently than short-term or 
small debt, but the issue is not length or size simpliciter but whether 
length or size differs enough to generate different default probabilities on 
the part of creditors . Thus the explanation is not necessarily disconfirmed 
by the practice of firms , whose financing is primarily short-term,  often to 
issue some secured debt. For particular debtors , a six-month loan may be 
long-term if the question is default probability . Nor is the explanation 
necessarily disconfirmed by the practice of some firms never to sell se­
cured debt although they obtain credit for different periods or in differ­
ent magnitudes .  Such firms may nevertheless pose similar probabilities 
of default because of their earning capacities or other factors. The 
heterogeneous-expectations explanation is thus similar to the uncertainty 
explanation.  It is internally coherent but is weakened by apparent coun­
terexamples that themselves could conceivably be dissolved by adequate 
empirical investigation. 50 
50 Lawyers sometimes argue that security is desirable because it enables firms in financial 
difficulty to borrow rather than go bankrupt. This argument is more a justification of some 
forms of security than an explanation of the existence of security itself, because many firms 
issue secured debt before they are in trouble . Further, when a firm is having difficulties its 
assets often seem to be l iened ; thus this bankruptcy-avoidance argument actually purports to 
justify " super priorities , "  in which later secured lenders obtain priority over earlier secured 
lenders in assets that are subject to the earlier secured lenders' security interests .  The code 
creates such priorities, and the Bankruptcy Act ratifies them . See U . C . C .  §§ 9-30 1 and 9-3 1 2  
(purchase money security interests) and § 9-308 (purchasers o f  chattel paper). The code's  
rules would be justifiable on efficiency grounds if  the earlier secured creditors would volun­
tarily have subordinated themselves to the later secured creditors; in this circumstance, the 
code· s creation of super priorities would actually represent the drafting of subordination 
agreements for the parties, and would thus save transaction costs.  No good reasons are 
apparent, however, for why early secured creditors would commonly agree to subordinate 
their l iens to later secured creditors when their common debtors are in difficulty. Another 
efficiency justification for the code and Bankruptcy Act is possible, however. Suppose that a 
debtor's going-concern value would exceed its liquidation value if the debtor could get cash 
with which to continue, but that no creditor would lend unless it received the highest 
priority. In this case , granting priority would be optimal for the group of earlier creditors , but 
agreeing to the priority might not be optimal for a particular early secured creditor; such a 
creditor could perhaps do better by foreclosing against a shaky debtor than by taking its 
chances in a lower priority position than it had previously enjoyed. The code ' s  granting of a 
super-priority position to the later creditor in return for lending new funds may therefore be 
efficient. It would permit the debtor to continue and thus lead to the optimal outcome for the 
creditors as a group. 
This efficiency story is promising but has difficulties. First, it fails to explain w hy the 
parties generally issue security but rather justifies the Jaw's  protection of security interests 
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F. Summary 
Efficiency explanations for the existence of secured debt suffer from 
one or more of three difficulties .  First, they seem to predict wrongly the 
absence or presence of security (monitoring costs , staggering debt, un­
certainty, heterogeneous expectations) . Second, they fail to explain why 
creditors and firms use security rather than other devices (signaling, risk 
aversion, uncertainty) . Third, they fail to show that the social gains from 
secured debt exceed its social costs (signaling) . Some of these expla­
nations seem plausible in particular circumstances, suggesting that if they 
were combined a valid efficiency explanation of secured debt could be 
developed.  Combining explanations, however, is an unsatisfactory re­
sponse to the difficulties that each explanation faces .  These explanations 
actually are theories .  If a theory explains one set of circumstances but 
fails to account for a second important set of circumstances, and another 
theory accounts for the second set but fails to account for the first, it is 
wrong to say that the world is well understood because our theories 
account for all relevant events .  The world is poorly understood because 
two weak theories exist . To be sure , a metatheory combining the best 
elements of both may resolve all difficulties, but no such metatheory of 
security exists . In consequence , the efficiency justification for the current 
bankruptcy priority list is unsatisfactory in its present form. Before 
exploring the normative implications of this difficulty, we shall consider 
under particular circumstances. Second, the story presupposes that later creditors would 
lend with security but would not make loans at interest rates that adequately compensated 
them for the risks they would take if they lent unsecured. The assumption apparently needs 
justification. Third, this efficiency story fails to justify present state law because the code 
grants super priorities to secured debt issued by debtors in complete financial health. A 
purchase money secured party , for example, takes priority over an after-acquired property 
financer regardless of the debtor' s financial status .  The Bankruptcy Act, however. allows a 
bankruptcy trustee who is operating the debtor"s business during bankruptcy proceedings to 
sell debt senior to existing debt only if this is essential to the debtor' s continuance (and if the 
early secured parties receive "adequate protection") .  § 364(d). Theories focusing on the 
consequences of dissolving the debtor thus may have promise for ultimately explaining and 
justifying aspects of bankruptcy liquidation law. 
A final possible efficiency explanation of secured debt is that security reduces collection 
costs. A secured creditor need not sue a debt to judgment and execute on its debtor's assets, 
nor need it participate in a bankruptcy l iquidation; rather, the creditor can simply take the 
property subject to its l ien.  See U.C.C.  § 9-503. This explanation suffers from the same 
difficulties as some of those described above. In particular, collection costs apparently vary 
inversely with the size of the asset pool; that is,  the more assets there are the easier it is to 
collect a debt. Thus when a creditor removes assets from the common pool,  the collection 
costs of unsecured creditors rise. The issue then is whether the decline in the secured creditor' s  
expected collection costs exceeds the rise i n  the unsecured creditors' expected collection 
costs. The answer to this question is not obvious. Moreover, secured parties often cannot 
foreclose when their debtors default because the Bankruptcy Act continues the collateral 
in the debtor' s possession to preserve the possibility of reorganization. See text at notes 
43-47 supra.
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distributional explanations for the existence of security , to analyze more 
fully the motivations of firms in granting it. 
III. DISTRIBUTIONA L  EXPLANATIONS
A .  The ' ' Offensive ' '  Distributional Explanation 
Distributional explanations for the existence of secured debt are of two 
related kinds-the "offensive" and the "defensive . "51 The former re­
laxes the assumption made in Part II-A that a firm's  unsecured creditors 
are aware of security and react to its issuance by raising their interest 
rates .  Suppose that some of these creditors fail to do this . Firms would 
then have an incentive to issue secured debt because they would benefit 
from the lower interest rates secured creditors would charge but not be 
harmed by higher interest rates charged elsewhere . In this circumstance , 
secured debt redistributes wealth from uninformed creditors (who fail to 
react to security) to firms. 52 Firms would then be anxious to make secured 
loans, so demand for these loans would increase ; thus secured cred­
itors-primarily banks and finance companies-would share some of the 
gains made at the expense of the uninformed creditors. 
This distributional explanation predicts that firms will issue secured 
debt only when a substantial number of their creditors are uninformed. 
The prediction has some empirical support . Consider retailers in con­
sumer markets . A retailer' s creditors include not only its financers and 
sellers but also its customers and employees .  A customer who buys from 
a retailer has a potential warranty claim. Further, hard goods ,  such as 
appliances or cars , often are bought with service contracts or under the 
standard repair or replacement warranty . Customers who have made par­
tial or full payment would be entitled to restitution if the goods are defec­
tive . Retailers are debtors respecting consumer-warranty claims ; that is , 
customers have potential claims against retailers for money or services ,  
and the retailers have a corollary potential liability . If  assets are with-
drawn from the pool otherwise available to satisfy the warranty claims of 
customers and devoted to the claims of different creditors , the purchase 
risks of the customers are increased ; their claims against firms will be 
more difficult to satisfy .  Purchases from "secured firms" are, conse-
quently, less attractive than purchases from unsecured firms, so the 
secured firms should command lower prices .  These lower prices are the 
51 Both explanations are described in James H.  Scott. Bankruptcy.  Secured Debt. and 
Optimal Capital Structure: Reply, 34 J. Finance 253 ( 1 979) ; and James H .  Scott, Bank­
ruptcy,  Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. Finance 1 ( 1 977). 
52 The text supposes an " uninformed creditor" to be ignorant of the existence of security 
or not sophisticated enough to respond appropriately to security if he or she knows of it. 
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product-market equivalent f h h" . creditors in financi 1 k 
0 t e igher mterest rates that unsecured
But if retail custo;.e�a�r:ts charge to a firm that issues secured debt.unaware of the existence f "t h . demand for the goods of secured firms w·n b 0 secun Y ,  t etr . . i e unaffected by it. Thesecustomers consequently will pay higher prices th th h measured by their own (informed) preferences Th�nexcey s �lullbd pay ' as . . · ess wi e sharedby retailers and the tr finance rs . 53 
E mployees are creditors for their wages and should receive high 
wages ,  other things equal , from secured than from unsecured firms b:� 
cause security makes the former firms more risky to deal with. Retail 
employees ,  however, are less likely to be organized than manufacturing 
employees and more likely to be employed on a casual or seasonal basis.  
Retail employees may therefore have relatively less power and knowledge 
than manufacturing employees to demand higher wages from secured 
firms, with the result that these firms (and their financers) may capture 
some of the wealth of the employees .  
The offensive distributional explanation seems correctly to predict that 
firms will issue secured debt when a substantial number of their creditors 
are uninformed. 54 It apparently predicts wrongly the absence of security , 
however, in cases when most of a firm' s creditors would be aware of 
security and could react to its e xistence . As Part 11-B showed, when 
creditors are informed and capable ,  security generates no reductions in 
net interest rates for the firm. Thus the offensive distributional explanation 
predicts that those industrial firms whose sellers , buyers , and financers all 
seem sophisticated will rarely secure the debt they sel l .  In practice , how­
ever, these firms often issue some secured debt . This explanation there­
fore is also unconvincing. 
B .  The "Defensive ' "  Distributional Explanation 
The defensive distributional explanation assumes that creditors are in­
formed and competent . Suppose that a creditor is asked to lend unsecured 
to a firm that has issued no secured debt. Will it charge an interest rate 
53 Customer claims arise not only from warranties but also from the purchase of goods on 
" layaway· ' or the purchase of gift certificates or money orders. The new Bankruptcy Act 
accords fifth priority to 
. . . . .  individuals ,  to the extent of $900 for each such individual, arising from the deposit 
. . .  of money in connection with the purchase, lease or rental of property . or the purchase 
of services ,  for the personal, family or household use of such individuals ,  that were 
not delivered or provided . . . 
§ 507(a)(5) .  Fifth-priority claimants are unlikely to do well .  Less frequently,  consumers can
have tort claims or claims for late or nondelivery. 
54 The offensive distributional explanation can coexist with explanations that claim se­
cured debt to be efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. See note 7 supra . 
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reflecting that all of the firm· s assets are available to satisfy creditor 
claims? It may not because , if this relatively low rate is charged ,  the firm 
has an incentive to issue secured debt after the initial loan is made .  By so 
doing, it would obtain the advantage of the lower rate secured debt com­
mands without the disadvantage of the higher rate unsecured creditors 
would charge in response . Creditors , however, anticipating the later is­
suance of secured debt, will charge the interest rate for unsecured debt 
that would be charged if the firm were already secured .55 But if this is 
done , the firm must promptly issue secured debt : only in this way can it 
offset the high interest rates required by its creditors' anticipation that such 
debt will later be issued .  Further, the two distributional explanations can 
be combined:  firms issue secured debt to defend themselves against in­
formed creditors who expect it and to exploit uninformed creditors who 
are ignorant of it .  
The " defensive' ·  distributional explanation suffers from familiar dif­
ficulties.  It predicts that all firms initially will borrow secured, and will 
secure as much debt as the y  can. This is because if a firm' s first creditor 
will charge an interest rate that reflects later security , the firm should 
secure the first creditor (and all others so long as it has free assets) .  In this 
way, it can receive the benefit of secured debt' s lower interest rate as 
soon as possible . Nothing is gained and something lost by securing the 
seventh rather than the first creditor, when some creditors will have to be 
secured in any e vent. Yet many firms fail to borrow according to this 
pattern .  
Another difficulty with the explanation i s  that firms to some extent can 
prevent early unsecured creditors from charging interest rates that reflect 
anticipated security by using loan covenants . Common covenants prohibit 
firms from issuing later debt with a higher priority than early debt. These 
prohibitions sometimes specifically refer to purchase money and real es­
tate mortgages .  56 In addition , covenants sometimes expressly protect 
early creditors against later issuance of security by providing that the 
early creditors " must have their priority upgraded and be given an equal 
claim on the collateral with the secured debtholders . "57 If security per-
55 If creditors suppose the probability that a firm will issue security after a loan is made to 
be less than one, the firm can exploit these creditors by issuing security. This is because a 
probability figure less than one implies an interest rate that does not fully reflect the exis­
tence of security. In this case, the firm can make gains by later issuing it. Early creditors thus 
have an incentive to assume that later secured debt will be issued with a probability of one, 
as the text supposes.  Creditors, however, do have incentives to set realistic probability 
figures.  If those figures are less than one, the defensive distributional explanation neverthe­
less holds. 
56 Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 32-34.
57 Id. at 32.
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forms the. function of forestalling initially high interest rates ,  it must bebecause m som� cases it does so more cheaply than loan covenantswould . _Explanations .of w.hen and how this would occur are lacking . 
. 
If vahd, th� defensive distributional explanation is nevertheless norma-tively troubling.  Should security generate no r d t. · · e uc ions m net mterestrates but be used to prevent creditors from capturin th Ith f fi h 
· 
· f · 
g e wea o rms,t e g1v1?g o secunty rep�esents a deadweight efficiency loss. No newwealth is created by the issuance of security yet si·nce . . , resources aredevoted to creatmg It, someone is made worse off by its existence .
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND A RESEARCH AGENDA
Parts I I  and III of this paper argue that no convincing explanation for 
the issuance of short-term secured debt exists ; it is not known with assur­
ance whether security is efficient, as some explanations of its existence 
assert, or inefficient,  as the signaling and distributional explanations sug­
gest is possible .  With the record in this state , it may seem appropriate for 
a decision maker to pursue whatever normative views respecting bank­
ruptcy liquidations he happens to hold .  In particular, since Congress has 
already selected a set of creditors for special treatment, the priority of 
these creditors perhaps should be raised above that of secured parties ,  on 
the ground that a good case for subordinating them has yet to be made . 
Such an action, or others actuated by similar motives ,  would now be 
premature because satisfactory normative reasons for altering current law 
are also hard to find . In consequence , this part first explores the implica­
tions of law reform that follow from a rejection of the efficiency justifica­
tion for the current bankruptcy priority list . It next illustrates the difficul­
ties that make significant law reform unwise at present and concludes with 
a brief summary of the important unresolved positive and normative is­
sues respecting bankruptcy liquidations. 
A .  Possible Reforms 
Suppose that the assumption of creditor knowledge and ability to react 
to security is partially false , that some creditors are disadvantaged by firm 
failures they can neither foresee nor avoid . Two reforms are then implied: 
to prohibit security or make it much more difficult to take , or to elevate 
the priority status in bankruptcy liquidations of particular creditor groups. 
The former reform is unwise . Secured debt has not been shown to be 
inefficient; the signaling and distributional explanations indicate only that 
inefficiency is conceivable . Thus significantly reducing the opportunity to 
take security seems precipitate . Further, creditors and firms are likely to 
want a good deal of security even at higher cost levels ,  as they did before 
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the code . Reducing the costs to many parties of doing what they would do 
anyway thus will produce some gains . Finally , any harm that secured debt 
generates will fall heaviest on particular unsecured creditors . The free­
dom of firms and secured creditors is maximized if these commercial 
parties  are unregulated but those disadvantaged by security are helped 
directly .  All these reasons suggest that the cost-reducing innovations of 
article 9 should be preserved even if the assumption of creditor knowledge 
is sometimes false . 
The appropriate response to creditor ignorance is to elevate the priority 
status of those creditors thought deserving of help. At present, secured 
parties are paid in full ,  to the extent of their security interests, before any
other creditors are paid . Any effort at law reform should alter this priority 
list: consumers , employees ,  small-trade creditors , tort claimants,  or any 
others whom Congress wants to favor should be paid first , e ither in full or 
up to statutorily created levels .  Such a reform would increase the costs of 
secured debt . Secured creditors would be able to realize less on default , 
and greater uncertainty would attend the use of security since secured 
creditors would have difficulty predicting the extent to which they may 
later be subordinated.  Nevertheless , revising priorities is preferable to 
increasing the costs of secured debt in other ways.  Priority revision helps 
directly those thought deserving of help and gives firms and secured 
creditors more freedom in arranging their affairs . 
B .  Issues to Be Resolved before Revising the Priority List 
That distributional or other normative objectives should be pursued 
more vigorously in bankruptcy contexts fails to follow from a showing 
that security conceivably is inefficient . An affirmative law reform case 
must be made because pursuit of any such case is expensive . The case for 
revising priorities seems strongest when particular creditors are unaware 
of or cannot react to security . In this circumstance , firms and sophisti­
cated creditors use secured debt with the possible intention and certain 
effect of redistributing wealth to themselves and from creditors who 
would prevent these redistributions were they informed. Notions of cor­
rective justice imply a remedy for the disadvantaged creditors in this 
c ircumstance .  A theory of corrective justice provides that a plaintiff can­
not prevail against a defendant unless the defendant has wrongfully 
harmed some interest of the plaintiff. Such a theory must therefore iden­
t ify which interests "belong to" or are " owned" by the plaintiff as well as 
what actions "wrongfully' ' harm these interests. Corrective justice the­
orists give content to the concepts of interests and wrongs by reference 
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both to moral theories and to widely shared moral sentiments . 58 In issues 
of bankruptcy priority , most moral theories as well as commonly shared 
moral notions accord persons or business entities protected interests in 
property .  When wealth is redistributed from inept or uninformed 
creditors , their interests prima facie have been invaded. Further, the 
moral sentiments of ordinary persons might consider the invasion to be 
wrongful , for it reflects the disadvantaging of the weak by the strong. 
Thus corrective justice could require unsophisticated or ignorant 
creditors to have a remedy against the firms and secured creditors that 
harmed them. 
The case for corrective justice does not seem compelling because ordi­
nary persons probably would not regard security as wrongful in the same 
sense that fraud or theft is ,  particularly since secured parties and firms 
sometimes may fail to realize that they are inflicting harm on other 
creditors . Also, the harm done often seems relatively slight . A decision 
maker deciding whether to recognize a right on corrective justice grounds 
is entitled to consider the consequences that recognition would entail . If 
security were shown to be efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense , 59 this effi­
ciency would count against a corrective justice right to a revised priority 
list , because pursuit of this right would raise the costs and thus reduce the 
gains from security . But a persuasive showing of efficiency has not been 
made and in its absence a decision maker could justifiably pursue the 
plausible corrective justice case for revising bankruptcy priorities .  60 
58 See , e . g . ,  John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law . 8 J. Legal Stud . 4 1 9  ( 1 979) ;  
Richard A .  Epstein. Intentional Harms,  4 J .  Legal Stud . 3 9 1  ( 1 975) :  Richard A .  Epstein, A 
Theory of Strict Liability. 2 J. Legal Stud. 1 5 1  ( 1 973 ) :  George P. Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Theory. 85 Harv. L. Rev .  537 ( 1 972). For a critical discussion of corrective 
justice theories ,  see Izhak Englard , The System B uilders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem 
American Tort Theory . 9 J. Legal Stud. 27. 57-68 ( 1 980). See also Richard A. Posner,
Epstein ' s  Tort Theory: A Critique. 8 J. Legal Stud. 457 ( 1 979). 
59 Security could be efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if it generated cost reductions for 
firms and secured creditors that exceeded the (uncompensated) cost increases of the unse­
cured creditors. See note 7 supra . In recent years, serious questions have been raised 
concerning whether it is normatively desirable or sometimes even technically feasible for 
decision makers to pursue the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency goal. as that goal is traditionally 
conceived. Even if security were shown to be efficient in the restricted world of economic 
models . the extent to which this efficiency should count against adoption of the corrective 
justice case for bankruptcy priority reform would remain an open question. But since no 
plausible theoretical efficiency explanations of security now exist, analysis of the efficiency 
goal itself is beyond the scope of this paper. 
60 Professor Kronman has recently argued that it sometimes is appropriate to pursue 
distributional concerns in contexts where all parties bargain with each other. Anthony T.  
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice. 89 Yale L .  J .  472 ( 1 980). The area of 
secured debt and bankruptcy priorities may constitute such a context. In addition to the 
difficulties about to be discussed respecting such a pursuit, however, it should be added that 
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Before acting on this case , however, the factual accuracy of its prem­
ises must be shown, not asserted.  This is a difficult task.  Plausibly estab­
lishing the incompetence of contracting parties ,  such as the employees 
and consumers at issue here , is hard to do . 61 The incompetence of em­
ployees is especially problematic when, as often happens,  the employees 
are organized in unions.  Further, it is not enough to show that some of 
these parties are uninformed, because markets can work well in the face 
of substantial numbers of uninformed persons.  The informed employees 
and consumers in some cases may police the market sufficiently to ensure 
that wages and prices accurately reflect the existence of security . 62 Thus 
the seemingly plausible corrective justice case for revising bankruptcy 
priorities is in fact premature because the circumstances in which it would 
apply have yet to be established.  
When this case is inapplicable , a persuasive normative argument for 
revising bankruptcy priorities seems hard to find. Consider " small-trade" 
creditors , who supposedly are among the class disadvantaged by current 
law. These creditors must now be assumed able to anticipate bankruptcy 
and learn of security , for such creditors would otherwise be inj ured by 
security in the way the corrective justice case suppose s .  But if these 
assumptions were true , the small-trade creditors would be compensated 
for bearing the risk of a low priority status in bankruptcy because the cost 
of this risk would be an element of the market price that their buyers must 
pay . The trade creditors would seem to need no help from the state in this 
circumstance . Further, if bankruptcy priorities were revised,  the costs to 
banks and finance companies of extending credit would be raised,  with the 
result that these entities might make fewer loans.  This outcome would 
disadvantage the employees and shareholders of the banks and finance 
companies .  On the information that now exists , it is difficult to say that 
these persons are less " deserving" than the persons who own or work for 
the small-trade creditors . No normative ground for revising bankruptcy 
priorities thus seems apparent except the corrective justice case . 
any d iscussion of distributional issues in bankruptcy is incomplete without a consideration 
of the government's  tax priority .  See Bankruptcy Act § 507(a)(6). This priority seriously 
d isadvantages general creditors. Also, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, a Fed-
era) agency, has a lien superior to the claim of unsecured creditors on the assets of a firm that 
fails to fund fully certain pension plans .  See ERISA, § 4068, 29 U . S .C .  § 1 368 ( 1 975). Given 
the large number of pension plans now in existence, this lien could also harm unsecured 
credit extenders. Discussion of the appropriateness of these government priorities is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
61 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L.
Rev .  1 053 ( 1 977). 
62 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 37. 
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C.  Issues That Deserve Study 
The normative desirability of any bankruptcy priority list cannot be 
convincingly established on the basis of current knowledge . The con­
ventional view that article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Bankruptcy Act strike a desirable balance between the interests of se­
cured and unsecured creditors thus is seriously deficient . Before accept­
ing it or any other conclusion, research should be done on the following 
issues :  (i) Can explanations of the existence of secured debt be developed 
that are testable and account for much of the observed data? (ii) The 
observed data is largely the product of casual empiricism. Would rigorous 
empirical work confirm theories that now seem questionable or indicate 
possibilities of new theories?  (iii) When do the factual premises of the 
corrective justice case hold? ( iv)  Apart from this case , can a coherent 
normative argument for revising the bankruptcy priority list be made? 
CONCLUSION 
Present bankruptcy law provides that secured parties are to.be paid first 
and in full before any other creditors of an insolvent debtor are paid at all .  
The principal justification for this priority list i s  that short-term secured 
debt is efficient and thus its purchase should be as convenient as possible .  
This justification has not been proved; no plausible showing that secured 
debt actually increases welfare e xists . Further, firms in some circum­
stances may issue such debt to redistribute wealth to themselves from just 
those persons to whom standard distributional rationales would accord 
special treatment. If, in light of these conclusions, different normative 
concerns should be pursued in bankruptcy liquidations, the appropriate 
method for doing so is to elevate the priority status of those thought to 
require more favorable treatment . But these conclusions do not them­
selves support such a course . That the efficiency justification for present 
law is problematic means only that other concerns should become rele­
vant, not paramount . Attention should now focus on whether the effi­
ciency justification can be made persuasive and whether attractive nor­
mative cases for particular bankruptcy priority lists can be made out. 
Inquiries of this sort , it may be remarked ,  probably are appropriate in 
related contexts as well because positivist explanations of several other 
legally relevant financial practices also seem relatively undeveloped. 
